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cerned with whether Kosmas' credibility 
was a crucial issue. The state's case de-
pended on circumstantial evidence that 
the defendant mistreated his wife and 
that he tried to put out a contract for her 
murder. The court said the evidence of 
Kosmas' refusal to take a lie detector test 
"cut to the heart of the defense." Id. at 
597, 560 A.2d at 1142. 
Finally, the curative effect of the jury 
instruction was addressed. Judge McAu-
liffe opined that the instruction was in-
sufficient to cure the substantial preju-
dice poisoning the jurors' opinion of 
the defendant. He relied on Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) to 
support this position. In that case, the 
Supreme Court said, "[t]here are some 
contexts in which the risk that the jury 
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is 
so great, and the consequences of failure 
so vital to the defendant, that the practi-
cal and human limitations of the jury 
system cannot be ignored." Kosmas, 316 
Md. at 597, 560 A.2d at 1143 (quoting 
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135). 
Accordingly, Kosmas v. State indicates 
that Maryland courts are becoming in-
creaSingly intolerant of any evidence that 
a defendant refused to take a polygraph 
exam. This case also warns prosecutors 
not to ask open-ended questions on di-
rect examination unless they are confi-
dent that the information solicited will 
not be substantially prejudicial to the 
defendant. 
-Gregory R. Smouse 
Wilson v. Morris: EVIDENCE OF 
PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT PATIENT 
MONITORING POLICIES IS 
ADMISSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE 
THE STANDARD OF CARE 
In Wilson v. Morris, 312 Md. 284, 563 
A.2d 392 (1989), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that evidence of prior and 
subsequent procedures for transporting 
patients was relevant and admissible as a 
consideration of the required standard 
of care. Thus, the court of appeals af-
firmed the decision of the court of special 
appeals, which had remanded the case 
for a new trial. 
Irene Ragland, appellee, brought an 
action against a hospital director and a 
county health department receptionist 
as a result of personal injuries sustained 
while she was a patient in the Western 
Maryland Adult Day Care Treatment 
Center ("the Center''). Wilson, 312 Md. 
at 287,563 A.2d at 393. Ragland was re-
turning from a doctor's office adjacent to 
the Center when Ann G. Wilson, the re-
ceptionist, temporarily left Ragland unat-
tended in a wheelchair at the top of a 
handicapped access ramp. When the 
wheelchair rolled down the access ramp, 
Ragland fell forward on to the pedals and 
fractured two vertebrae. Approximately 
eighteen months prior to the accident, 
and again, beginning the day after the ac-
cident, the Center's policy was for an at-
tendant to remain with a patient while 
transporting the patient between the two 
facilities.Id. at 288, 563 A.2d at 393. At 
the time of the aCcident, however, the 
Center's policy was to have an attendant 
accompany the patient to and from the 
adjacent facility, but not to wait there 
during the course of treatment. Id. at 288 
n.5, 563 A.2d at 393 n.5. The trial court 
refused to admit the evidence of the 
Center's prior and subsequent practices 
and concluded that such evidence was 
irrelevant and inadmissible. Id. at 288, 
563 A.2d at 393. The court of special 
appeals reversed the trial court's ruling. 
The intermediate appellate court held 
that the Center's prior and subsequent 
procedures demonstrated a pattern of 
conduct which made those procedures 
relevant and admissible. Id. at 288, 563 
A.2d at 394 (citing Morris v. Wilson, 74 
Md. App. 663, 668,539 A.2d 1151, 1153-
54 (1988». 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari to consider the law 
under which evidence of prior and sub-
sequent practices is admissible to prove 
an alleged breach of the applicable stan-
dard of care. [d. at 289, 563 A.2d at 394. 
The issue concerning the admissibility 
of prior policy evidence was one of first 
impression in Maryland. Consequently, 
the court examined the case law of other 
jurisdictions. In Welsh v. Burlington N. 
R. R., 719 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. App. 1986), 
an injured employee provided evidence 
that a railroad company had abandoned 
a policy that supplied employees with 
carts for the purpose of loading propane 
tanks. The Missouri Court of Appeals 
held that the testimony regarding the 
previous use of the carts to load pro-
pane tanks was relevant and probative on 
the issue of whether the defendant was 
negligent in failing to provide reasonably 
safe employee equipment. Wilson, 317 
Md. at 292, 563A.2d at 396 (citing Welsh, 
719 S.W.2d at 797). In another case, a 
woman tripped and fell upon a store 
entrance floor mat. Id. (relying on Swiler 
v. Baker's Super Market, Inc., 277 
N.W.2d 697 (Neb. 1979». InSwiler, the 
evidence revealed that on wet and rainy 
days, it was the store owner's usual prac-
tice to tape the mat to the floor to protect 
against slipping. The Supreme Court of 
Nebraska ruled that the trial court prop-
eclyallowed the plaintiff to introduce evi-
dence relative to the store-owner's past 
practice of taping or securing the mat in 
question to the floor to prevent bulging. 
Wilson, 317 Md. at 294, 563 A.2d at 396 
(citingSwiler, 277 N.W.2d at 700). 
Applying the holdings in Welsh and 
Swiler, the court of appeals held the 
prior practice of the Center was relevant 
under the circumstances. [d. at 295, 563 
A.2d at 397. The court also found the 
evidence of the prior policy a material 
fact to be considered in analyzing 
whether the current policy was reasona-
bly safe or whether other methods could 
have been easily adopted. Id. Moreover, 
the court stated that the trial judge 
should consider the following test for de-
termining whether prior policies should 
be allowed as evidence: 
1) The remoteness in time of the 
prior policy; 
2) The degree and significance of 
the change in relation to the substan-
tive issues presented; 
3) The reasons for the change in 
policy; and 
4) The likelihood that any prejudi-
cial effect of the proffered evidence 
will outweigh the probative value of 
the evidence. 
Id. Thus, the court held that the Center's 
prior policy of remaining with patients 
taken for medical care was probative in 
revealing the Center's knowledge and 
perception of its duty to patients. [d. at 
294-95,563 A.2d at 397. 
Next, the court discussed whether 
subsequent policy evidence was admis-
sible to prove the scope of the duty of 
care owed to the plaintiff. The court 
recognized that there was "a standard of 
care exception" to the general rule ex-
cluding evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures when such evidence 
"provi~es circumstantial proof that the 
applicable standard of care had not been 
met at the time of the accident or other 
occurrence in question." [d. at 298, 563 
A.2d at 395 (quoting 51. McLain, Mary-
land Practice: Maryland Evidence § 407.1 
(1987, 1989 Supp.». The court's opin-
ion stated that although a jury should not 
consider the evidence of the immediate 
change in patient monitoring policies as 
an admission of negligence, it was admis-
sible as evidence of the standard of care 
required under the circumstances. Id. at 
301, 563 A.2d at 400. Therefore, the 
court ruled that the trial judge erred in 
precluding counsel from offering the 
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proper grounds for which evidence of 
subsequent conduct should be admitted. 
Id. 
Finally, the Wilson court was careful to 
reconcile its holding with the federal rule 
on subsequent remedial measures. The 
federal rule reasonably restricts the ad-
missibility of such evidence to those situ-
ations where needed; that is, "when of-
fered for another purpose such as pro-
viding ownership, control or feasibility 
of precautionary measures, if contro-
verted, or impeachment." Fed. R. Evid. 
407. However, the court pointed outthat 
the advisory committee's note to Federal 
Rule 407 expressly lists "existence of 
duty" as a valid basis for admitting evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures. 
Wilson, 317 Md. at 297 n.8, 563 A.2d 405 
n.8. Thus, the court restated the prin-
ciple that evidence of subsequent con-
duct should not be received as an admis-
sion of negligence or liability, but that the 
standard of care exception is Maryland 
law.ld. at 300-01, 563 A.2d at 400. 
In Wilson, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that evidence of prior and 
subsequent hospital practices were rele-
vant and admissible to prove the alleged 
breach ofthe applicable standard of care. 
In addition, the court provided a test to 
determine admissibility of such prior 
evidence. However, the danger inherent 
in following the Wilson standard is that 
the allowability of prior or subsequent 
evidence could provide indirect proof of 
causation, or in effect, the exception 
could "swallow the [general] rule" pro-
hibiting the admission of such evidence. 
Id. at 300,563 A.2d at 400 (quoting 5 L. 
McLain, Maryland Practice: Maryland 
Evidence § 407.1 (1987, 1989 Supp.». 
Consequently, to allow both prior and 
subsequent evidence might make such 
evidence tantamount to an admission of 
negligence, which the court of appeals 
has expressly precluded. 
-Stephen E. Cohill 
Andresen v. Andresen: MARYlAND 
COURTS NOT PERMITfED TO 
REDETERMINE MARITAL PROPERlY 
MORE THAN 30 DAYS AFfER FINAL 
DIVORCE DECREE 
In Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 
564 A.2d 399 (1989), the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland considered the power 
of a court to modify a 1981 divorce de-
cree, which would have allowed a former 
spouse to share her former husband's 
military pension. The court held that the 
petitioner had not established any 
grounds upon which the trial court's 
28-The Law Forum/20.2 
final judgment could have been 
reexamined.ld. at 391, 564 A.2d at 405. 
The court reasoned that there was no 
authority under Maryland law which al-
lowed a court to redetermine marital 
property more than thirty days after the 
decree became final except in cases of 
fraud, mistake, irregularity or clerical 
errors.ld. at 387,564 A.2d at 403. Thus, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland af-
firmed the trial court's ruling. 
Ruth and Ralph Andresen were di-
vorced in Maryland on November 13, 
1981. The divorce decree provided for 
alimony and payment of attorney's fees 
but did not include sharing Mr. Andre-
sen's military pension benefits, which at 
that time could not have been subjected 
to division upon divorce according to 
federal law. 
On March 12, 1986, Ms. Andresen filed 
a motion in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County to modify the 1981 
divorce decree to allow her to share Mr. 
Andresen's military pension. Because 
Ms. Andresen's motion failed to specify 
the procedural mechanism by which a 
court could reopen the four-year-old 
divorce decree, Mr. Andresen's motion 
to dismiss was granted. Ms. Andresen 
appealed, and the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari prior to a 
decision by the intermediate appellate 
court to consider whether Mr. Andre-
sen's motion to dismiss was properly 
granted. On appeal, Ms. Andresen ar-
gued that the changes in the law consti-
tuted sufficient justification to reopen 
the enrolled divorce decree to allow 
sharing of Mr. Andresen's military pen-
sion benefits. Id. at 383, 564 A.2d at 401. 
The court of appeals began its discus-
sion of the applicable law by reviewing 
the changes in federal law. "On June 26, 
1981, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that, as matter of federal law, courts 
could not subject military retirement pay 
to division upon divorce." Id. at 382,564 
A.2d at 400 (citing McCarty v. McCarty, 
453 U.S. 210 (1981». After the Andre-
sen's divorce became final in 1981, fed-
eral statutory law changed thereby allow-
ing courts to consider military pensions 
as marital assets for distribution in di-
vorce proceedings.ld. In response to the 
McCarty deCision, Congress enacted the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act (USFSPA) on September 
8, 1982, effective February 1, 1983. The 
Act was codified in pertinent part as 10 
U.S.CA. § 1408 (c) (1). The USFSPA pro-
vided: 
Subject to the limitations of this 
section, a court may treat disposable 
retired or retainer pay payable to a 
[ service] member for pay periods 
beginning after June 25, 1981, ei-
ther as property solely of the mem-
ber or as property of the member 
and his spouse in accordance with 
the law of the jurisdiction of such 
court. 
317 Md. at 383, 564 A.2d at 401. 
The court noted that the purpose of 
the USFSPA was to overrule the McCarty 
decision thereby allowing state law to 
determine whether military pensions 
were marital property. Id. at 384, 564 
A.2d at 401. In addition, the court exam-
ined the legislative history which re-
vealed that the USFSPA was retroactive 
and allowed divorce decrees entered 
between the date of the McCarty deci-
sion and the effective date of the USFSPA 
to be reopened. Id. 
Furthermore, the court noted that 
under Maryland law, as construed in 
Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 
A.2d 883 (1981), pensions, including 
military pensions were marital property. 
In addition, the Maryland General As-
sembly had confirmed, as now codified in 
the Family Law Article, that a military 
pension shall be considered as any other 
pension or retirement benefit. Md. Fam. 
Law Code Ann. § 8-203(b) (1984). 
Pursuant to the USFSPA, the court 
found approximately thirty-five state 
courts had reopened divorce decrees. 
However, these jurisdictions followed 
Federal Rule 60(b)(5) and/or 60 (b) (6), 
which allowed post-final judgment relief. 
317 Md. at 386,564 A.2d at 402. Addi-
tionally, it was found that eight states 
reserved equity or other broad powers to 
reviseafinaljudgment. Id. at 386-87, 564 
A.2d at 403. Although the majority of 
courts had reopened finalized divorce 
derees to permit a former spouse to 
share military pension proceeds, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
Maryland law did not allow a Maryland 
court to reopen a divorce decree, which 
had been enrolled for more than thirty 
days, except as provided by Maryland 
Rule 2-535. Id. at 387, 564 A.2d at 403. 
In support of its decision, the court of 
appeals reiterated its earlier decision in 
Platt v. Platt, 302 Md. 9, 485 A.2d 250 
(1984), where it had held that the trial 
court lacked the power to revise a five-
year-old divorce decree. Andresen 317 
Md. at 388, 564 A.2d at 403. In Platt, the 
court had emphasized that there was no 
authority under Maryland law which 
would allow a re-examination of marital 
